黑料传送门

Since entering the 21st century, China's economic power has grown rapidly. As of 2024, the added value of its manufacturing is 60% larger than that of the United States and over five times larger than Japan's. Many people view the rise of China's industrial power as the result of the Chinese government vigorously promoting industrial policies. In Japan and the United States, stimulated by China's moves, governments are providing massive subsidies to foster their semiconductor industries. How, then, should we view China's industrial policies? Is the perspective that industrial policies have strengthened China's industrial power correct?
 
Upon careful examination of China's industrial policies, it becomes clear that they have often failed. For example, China accounts for more than half of the world's steel production, leading western observers to believe that China's steel industry grew because of industrial policies. However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the goal of China's steel industry policy has consistently been to curb production growth. The growth of the steel industry did not occur because of industrial policies; rather, it happened in spite of them. A key theme of the steel industry's policy was to consolidate the industry around large state-owned enterprises. However, the market share of large state-owned enterprises steadily declined, while private steel enterprises grew. This book unravels the mystery of why private steel enterprises, which were continuously sidelined in industrial policies, were able to grow so rapidly.
 
In 2014, the Chinese government established a national investment fund to foster the semiconductor industry. Subsequently, several local governments also set up funds to support the semiconductor industry, creating the appearance of a nationwide effort to bolster the sector. However, when examining the actual investment practices of these funds, the disparity between the initial announcements and reality is significant. Moreover, a flagship enterprise that received substantial investment from these funds went bankrupt.
 
Of course, there are also areas where industrial policies have succeeded. The electric vehicle (EV) promotion policy launched in 2010 achieved great success, and the LCD panel industry expanded to become the world's largest thanks to massive investments by local governments. As for the solar cell industry, the Chinese government initially had no intention of promoting it, but thanks to the enthusiasm of entrepreneurs and the support of some local governments, it quickly grew to become the world's largest. Later, trade friction with Europe and the United States led to the bankruptcy of several top manufacturers. To rescue its struggling domestic solar cell manufacturers, the Chinese government accelerated domestic solar power plans ahead of schedule. Although there were various problems with policy implementation, China's solar cell industry and solar power generation now hold an overwhelming global market share.
 
In summary, China's industrial policies have succeeded when the government focused on creating demand for the products or services of the relevant industry. The biggest problem facing the Chinese economy at present is insufficient domestic demand. If demand creation is the key to successful industrial development, then the government's current focus should be on addressing the lack of domestic demand. Industrial policies may have served their purpose, and this book concludes by arguing that they are gradually becoming unnecessary.
 

(Written by MARUKAWA Tomoo, Professor, Institute of Social Science / 2025)